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Abstract 
Since the independence of Armenia in 1991, relations with its western neighbor Turkey, has been on 
the agenda of the country’s successive administrations. After an initial warming up of the relations, the 
Turkish-Armenian border was closed for traffic. The economic arguments put aside, the opening of the 
Turkish-Armenian border also poses political implications which could influence not only the politics 
of both countries but also the overall geopolitics of the South Caucasus. Thus if Armenia and Turkey 
normalize their relations, a shift in the balance of power in the region would occur. This paper is an 
attempt to raise and examine the political issues related to the Turkish-Armenian border opening and 
the implications that it could have on the political outlook of Armenia as well as the geopolitical 
realignment in the South Caucasus. 
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Introduction 
Since their independence, the countries of the South Caucasus have tried to chart their 
foreign policies in a new environment of international and regional system. The lack of 
independent and sovereign experience to conduct foreign policy for these countries has made 
the foreign policy formulation process a task reliant on factors such as historical experience, 
perceptions of other actors’ intentions, domestic constraints and to some extent geopolitical 
realities. 
In the case of Armenia, historical experience and domestic politics played an 
important role in determining the new republic’s relations with its western neighbor Turkey. 
During the initial independent phase, the new Armenian leadership under President Levon 
Ter-Petrossian was very keen on establishing diplomatic relations with Turkey to 
counterbalance the Russian influence as well as to obtain an outlet towards the West for the 
infant republic. However despite the initiatives of the Armenian government to normalize 
relations with Turkey several factors rendered their attempts futile. 
The factors influencing the Turkish-Armenian relations are multifaceted. The reasons 
most commonly cited from either side include the following: Armenian demands and Turkish 
refusal for the recognition of the Genocide of the Armenians in 1915 by the Young Turks;1 
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh and Turkish solidarity with 
Azerbaijan; pressures from nationalists in both countries demanding a tougher policy against 
their neighbor; and economic dependence of Armenia from Turkey which in the minds of 
may Armenians is tantamount to political dependence. 
This paper will try to discuss the reasons why the Turkish-Armenian relations by 
looking at the developments in the bilateral relations between the two countries. The research 
will argue that the major political forces opposing the border opening in both countries are 
nationalists and that their opposition to the normalization of the relations between the 
countries is based on preconditions, which in turn are either emotional (support of Turkey to 
Azerbaijan as their ethnic keen) or historical (the demands by Armenian nationalists that 
Turkey recognizes the Genocide of 1915). On the other hand, supporters of opening the 
border use economic gains as the main tenant for their argument without any substantial 
economic research to back their position. This having said, it should be mentioned that the 
paper will not examine the economic impact of opening up the Turkish-Armenian border. 
Although there have been several scattered researches done on the economic relations 
between the two countries, the studies are not conclusive enough to provide a definite answer 
to the economic benefits or drawbacks that might result with the potential opening of the 
Turkish-Armenian border. The very few existing reports usually predict positive outcomes for 
both countries but the lack of substantial scientific research on this topic make it very difficult 
to examine the economic aspect in this context. 
 
The (D)evolution of Turkish-Armenian Relations 
After independence, Armenia pursued an active policy of independence, relying on 
regional and international powers to chart a policy of non-dependence on a single power. 
 
1 The recognition of the Genocide is closely associated with the territorial demands and reparations that Armenia 
might claim from Turkey if the latter recognizes its responsibility in the Genocide.  
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While this attempt promised to be a balanced one, in part because of strategic reasons 
Armenia remained in the Russian orbit.2
The Russian strategic interests in the Caucasus (both north and south) have led to the 
creation of a view that it is a protector of Armenia in the latter’s war against Azerbaijan.3 This 
view of Armenians as Russia’s pawns helped create an atmosphere of mistrust between 
Armenia on the one hand and its neighbors on the other based mostly on the premise that 
Armenia is a fifth column for the Russians in the region. Therefore, because of Armenia’s 
geopolitical isolation a sense of reliance on an outside force has developed in the Armenia 
psyche, this belief has been reinforced throughout the ages when mostly Russia has acted as 
that “outside” force. This reliance on Russia has continued even though the Russian views or 
policy towards Armenia has been less than consistent and Russian policy did have instances 
of “neglect” towards Armenia.4
However, in modern Armenian foreign policy priorities, not always did Russia or 
Russian orientation remained the only way out. Even when Armenia was obtaining its 
independence there were debates among intellectuals in Armenia regarding whether or not 
Armenia needs to rely on a third (outside) force to guarantee its independence. The 
overwhelming majority of those against reliance on third force were identified with the 
Armenian National Movement (ANM)—the organization that was the successor of the 
Karabakh movement and the party of independence.5 However there were also some 
nationalist circles such as the Armenia Revolutionary Federation (ARF) where several leading 
party intellectuals came out against Armenia’s dependence on third forces.6
In 1991 Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Armenian independence 
and even showed signs that it was willing to cooperate with the new republic.7 But in 1992 
Ankara put forward a set of preconditions to normalize its relations with Yerevan. These 
included: a) Armenia’s abandonment of all territorial claims (Western Armenia) from Turkey 
 
2 For an overview of the development of Armenia’s foreign policy, see Gary Bertsch and Cassady Craft, eds., 
Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia (New York: Routledge, 
1999); Bruno Coppieters, ed., Contested Borders in the Caucasus (Brussels: Vrije Universiteit Brussel Press, 
1996); Adeed Dawisha, and Karen Dawisha, eds., The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of 
Eurasia (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995); Edmund Herzig, The New Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999); Shireen Hunter, Transcaucasia in 
Transition: Nation Building or a New Empire? (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 1994); and Svante Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the 
Caucasus. (England: Curzon Press, 2001). 
3 Leila Alieva, “Reshaping Eurasia-Foreign Policy Strategies and Leadership Assets in Post-Soviet South 
Caucasus,” Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, Working Paper Series (University of California, 
Berkeley, 2000), 6-7. 
4 Ronald Suny deals with issue in Looking Towards Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993), 34-43. 
5 One of the most vocal presenters of this issue was Rafael Ishkhanian. See his “The Law Excluding the Third 
Force,” in Gerard Libaridian, ed., Armenia at the Crossroad: Democracy and Nationhood in the Post-Soviet Era 
(Watertown, MA: Blue Crane Books, 1991): 10-38. 
6 Two articles on this issue have appeared in May 13 and 27, 1987 issues of Droshak (the official ARF 
newspaper) by Khajag Der-Grigorian and Hrair Marukhian respectively. 
7 When the Turkish ambassador to Moscow paid a visit to Armenia in 1991, he expressed optimism for the 
development of normal relations between his country and Armenia. “Turkish Official Says Relations with 
Armenia ‘Relatively Positive’,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) (ME/1057/A/ 1), April 27, 1991. 
 4
                                                
and the recognition of Moscow Treaty;8 b) to call off the campaign by Armenians to force 
Turkey to recognize the Armenian Genocide; c) to drop Yerevan’s support for Nagorno-
Karabakh and to withdra Armenian troops from occupied Azerbaijani territory.9  
For its part, the first Armenian President, Levon Ter-Petrossian, realized that land-
locked Armenia required an outlet and that it needed to establish good relations with Turkey. 
Ter-Petrossian and the ANM claimed that Turkey was not the same country as it was 70 years 
ago and that establishing good relations with Ankara would benefit Armenia not only 
economically but politically as well.10 This idea was best expressed by a former senior 
advisor of Ter-Petrossian, who later wrote: 
 
What if having normal diplomatic and economic relations with Turkey is in the interest of 
Armenia as well as of Karabakh? Would not improved Armeno-Turkish relations weaken the 
Azerbaijani negotiating position, the rigidity of which is based on a policy of strangling the 
Armenian economy? Should the answer to these questions be positive… then the normalization of 
relations with Turkey would facilitate Armenia’s role as a transit route of Caspian Sea 
hydrocarbon resources.”11
 
This policy of establishing good relation with Turkey came under attack from many Armenian 
circles especially nationalist ones. The arguments that the nationalists such as the ARF 
maintained, was that Turkey remains a genocidal power, which if left unchecked would 
overrun Armenia and commit atrocities against the Armenian population.12 These fears were 
aggravated when the Turkish president Turgut Özal threatened Armenia with a blockade if a 
peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were not achieved.13In April 1993 
Ankara announced that it will stop the delivery of wheat or any other aid through its territory 
until the Armenian government complied with Ankara’s demands.14 This signaled the closing 
of the border between the two countries which remains as such until this day. 
 
Nationalist in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey, Unite! 
 During the 1990s, the entities opposing the opening of the border between Armenia 
and Turkey included the Armenian Diaspora, nationalist groups in both Armenia and Turkey 
and most importantly Azerbaijan. While some of these groups have merely voiced their 
concerns over the opening of the border, others have actively lobbied to prevent such an 
accomplishment from the Turkish government. 
 
8 Signed on March 16, 1921 the Moscow treaty set the current borders between Armenia and Turkey. 
9 Nikolay Hovhanisyan, The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Armenia in the Transcaucasian-Middle Eastern 
Geopolitical Region (Yerevan: Noyan Tapan, 1998), 31-32. 
10 See Hunter, Transcaucasia in Transition, 30. 
11 Gerard J. Libaridian, The Challenge of Statehood. Armenian Political Thinking Since Independence (Blue 
Crane Books, 1999), 116. 
12 Richard G. Hovannisian, “Historical Memory and Foreign Relations: The Armenian Perspective” in The 
Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, eds. Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha 
(Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995): 237-276. 
13 “Turkish Threat to Cut Off Armenia,” Financial Times, March 7, 1992. 
14 See “Turkish Wheat Deliveries to Armenia Stopped,” BBC SWB (SU/1660/C1), April 12, 1993. 
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On the Armenian side the major groups opposing the opening of the border are the 
Diaspora and several political parties in Armenia. What will follow is an attempt to look at the 
views of each of these groups regarding the border issue. Without a doubt, the ability of 
Armenia to conduct an influential (but not necessarily successful) foreign policy is very much 
dependent on the dispersed Armenian communities all over the world. At the time of 
independence and compared to most of the former Soviet republics, Armenia had the most 
exposure in foreign media stemming from the relentless efforts of the Diasporan Armenians. 
Since the first days of independence, the majority of the Diasporans have supported the 
foreign policy efforts of the new republic. As a result, Armenia was able to receive economic 
and humanitarian aid from international donors and institutions, simultaneously combating the 
efforts of big business and oil companies in the lobbying war against Azerbaijan. 
For instance, Armenia has benefited from the various Armenian communities around 
the world as those communities provide physical space for the embassies, and in some cases 
even incur the monetary costs of various embassy activities. These efforts are particularly 
helpful for small and new states, which face various challenges in conducting their foreign 
policies. Financial constraints hamper small states from investing considerable amounts of 
money in various diplomatic activities and in the case of Armenia the Diaspora alleviated that 
pressure. 
The formulation of foreign policy is dependent on different variables some of which 
include the geographic location and geography of the country, the state of the economy, 
security issues and the overall well-being of the state itself. All these factors are sometimes 
referred to as Realpolitik, corresponding to the conduct of politics in a realist way without 
being influenced by emotion, ideology, religion or historical experience. 
In the case of Armenia, conducting a foreign policy based on Realpolitik is difficult 
but not impossible. The difficulty arises from the fact that the Diaspora factor and their 
demands play an important role in Armenia’s foreign policy. Moreover the factors shaping the 
Diaspora’s understanding and conducting of foreign policy are more subjective. What is 
meant by subjective is the burden of history that Diasporan Armenians carry. A good example 
of the burden of history is the recognition of the Genocide and Turkish-Armenian relations. 
For the Diaspora, or at least a large section of the Diaspora, as well as a number of Armenians 
from Armenia, Turkey remains the default enemy, which not only refuses to accept its 
responsibility for the Genocide and the subsequent dispersion of Armenians all over the 
world, but also engages in an active policy of denial, a policy which certainly strengthens the 
position of Diasporan Armenians who perceive Turkey as that default enemy. Fueling these 
feelings is Turkey’s continuous blockade of Armenia and its insistence on putting forward 
preconditions to normalize ties with Armenia. Consequently, any agreement that the 
Armenian government makes with Turkey is viewed with skepticism by the Diaspora, which 
considers Turkey’s recognition of the Genocide to be a starting point of bilateral state-to-state 
relations. 
For their part, foreign policy makers and formulators in Armenia view Turkey as a 
regional power and a neighbor with which Armenia must establish diplomatic relations and 
engage in political and economic activities. In this formula, the burden of history is not 
forgotten, but is put on the backburner, or at least used as a card to exert pressure on Turkey. 
However the main dilemma facing Armenia’s foreign policy makers is how to balance 
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Realpolitik with the wishes and demands of the Diaspora and those of the nationalists in 
Armenia, which contributes in no small degree to the various economic and social 
development plans and projects in the republic. 
One of the most vocal opponents of opening up the Turkish-Armenian border is the 
ARF which has a nationalist view and is well established in the Diaspora. This might be one 
of the reasons why it is the major party in Armenia opposing the border opening since the 
party might have been too much identified with the Diaspora and shares its concerns and 
views.15 Other nationalist groups and parties in Armenia have also voiced their concern 
against the border opening considering it a direct threat not only to the interests of Armenian 
consumers, but also to Armenian statehood as a whole. These nationalist parties include the 
Union of Armenian Aryans, the Armenian Aryan Fist Party, the One Nation Party, the 
Nationalist Party of Armenia, the Military and Patriotic Union of Youth and others. All of 
these groups operate under an umbrella organization called the Armenian Nationalist Front.16 
While they have thus far, failed to provide a viable argument supporting their claims that the 
border opening would harm Armenia, they have repeatedly stated that such an act would hurt 
the Armenian economy.17 Apart from the economic arguments the ARF disputed that even if 
Turkey opens the border without any preconditions; such an act should be undertaken having 
in mind “the interests of other regional countries such as Russia and Iran.”18 Furthermore, the 
ARF put forward its own precondition for normalizing relations with Turkey which includes 
recognition of the Genocide.19
On the other side of the border, the groups opposing the opening of the border include 
Turkish politicians and nationalists and the Azerbaijani lobby. Whenever the issue of opening 
up the border became a topic of agenda, Turkey emphasized that this was out of question as 
long as Armenia did not comply with several of the conditions that they have put forward. 
One of the most recurring preconditions has been demands by Turkey that Armenia ceases its 
campaign to force Turkey recognize the Genocide of 1915.20 The introduction of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the Turkish-Armenian relations on Ankara’s initiative, and its 
usage as a pretext to close the border as late as 1993 (nearly two years after the start of 
independent relations between the two countries), could be a sign that the conflict was not a 
factor between the two states’ relations and that it was introduced only after the public 
opinion, along with some officials,21 in Turkey wanted their government to have a more pro-
 
15 Another party opposing the border opening is the Democratic Party of Armenia, which on occasions has 
announced its concurrence with the views of the ARF on this issue. 
16 Arminfo, August 8, 2003. 
17 The ARF has repeatedly spoken against the opening of border considering that such an act would prove 
disastrous economically and politically. See “Armenian Politicians, Economists Divided Over Opening Border 
With Turkey,” RFE/RL Caucasus Report 7, no. 38 (September 30, 2004). 
18 “Unchanged Turkey is a Serious Threat to our National Security,” Azg Daily, August 22, 2003. 
19 Ibid. 
20 The current Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan in his speech during a trip to the city of Kars on 
June 27, 2003 demanded from Armenia to give up its territorial claims from Turkey and to stop its Genocide 
claims. See “Turkish PM Insists On Preconditions For Improving Ties With Armenia,” RFE/RL June 30, 2003. 
21 At the time the opposition parties in Turkey adamantly demanded that their government goes to the extent of 
sending military aid to Azerbaijan. These parties included Islamist Welfare Party (RP), the Democratic Left 
Party (DSP) and the then main opposition Motherland Party (ANAP). The fact that the chairman of DSP Bülent 
 7
                                                                                                                                                        
Azerbaijani stance and put pressure on Armenia.22 Another factor that might explain the 
Turkish government’s solidarity with Azerbaijan and the introduction of the Nagorno-
Karabakh issue is to appease the Azerbaijani leadership which by that time was disillusioned 
by the lack of Turkish support in their war with Armenia and were looking for alternative–
read Iran–supporters to resist the Armenians.23
From the Azerbaijani perspective, similar statements have been repeatedly made 
whenever the border issue was raised. The confidence of Azerbaijani leadership that Ankara 
would not open up the border with Armenia until the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is solved has 
been reestablished on many occasions when the late Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev 
visited Turkey. At the end of almost every visit, President Aliyev reconfirmed that Turkey is 
taking into consideration Baku’s views in regards of the border opening.24 There have been 
many instances when it has been stated that Turkey would improve its relations with Armenia 
at the expense of Azerbaijan or Azerbaijan gave a positive response to the desire of Turkey to 
improve relation with Armenia. These statements, however, were disowned by Azerbaijan 
and Turkish officials. For instance in September 2003 when the Turkish and Azerbaijani 
foreign ministers–Abdullah Gül and Vilayet Guliyev–met in Ankara, they came up with a 
joint statement dismissing claims by Armenian Defense Minster Serge Sarkissian that the 
border would be opened in the near future.25
The latest developments related to the Turkish-Armenian border took place before and 
during the visit of Azerbaijan’s new President, Ilham Aliyev to Turkey in April of 2004. Prior 
to the visit, Azeri press declared that Turkey was likely to open its border with Armenia and a 
committee of Azerbaijani media representatives organized demonstrations in Turkey in order 
to protest against such an event.26 After meeting with the Turkish president and other 
officials, Aliyev reiterated his belief that the border between Turkey and Armenia will not be 
opening anytime soon. As leverage, Aliyev also emphasized that Azerbaijan will be one of the 
first countries to recognize the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to 
express his country’s support for Turkish diplomatic initiatives on that question.27
 
The Realpolitik of Opening the Border 
 Similar to those who oppose the border opening, the “camp” supporting the opening 
includes a wide range of individuals and institutions in both Turkey and Armenia. From the 
Armenian side, supporters of opening the border site two main reasons for their conviction. 
The first is that such an act could help fuel Armenia’s economy by lowering transport costs 
Ecevit when came to power several years later continued the more balanced policy of his predecessors makes 
one wonder if the demands by the opposition to militarily support were not made for local consumption. 
22 Shireen Hunter discusses in detail the domestic factors influencing Turkey’s relations with Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. See, Hunter, Transcaucasia in Transition, 163-166. 
23 The border closing from Ankara’s side came only days after the Azerbaijani President Abulfaz Elchibey 
dispatched his vice president, Panah Husseinov, to Tehran to seek “material and spiritual” aid in Azerbaijan’s 
conflict with Armenia. See details in “Disillusioned with Turkey, Azeris Turn to Iran,” Inter Press Service, April 
13, 1993. 
24 “President Aliyev Arrives in Turkey,” ITAR-TASS News Agency, January 9, 2000. 
25 “Gül Says Relations with Azerbaijan are Beyond Friendship,” Turkish Daily News, September 13, 2003. 
26 “Azeri Reporters Protest in Turkey’s Igdir Against Opening of Armenian Border,” BBC Monitoring, April 6, 
2004. 
27 “Azeri Daily Says President’s Cyprus Remarks Success of Diplomacy,” BBC Monitoring April 17, 2004. 
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and create new markets–although like the opposition these groups also fail to provide a viable 
economic study on this issue. Secondly, Armenian politicians realize that the opening of 
border with Turkey is a political victory not only for Armenia but also for the current 
Armenian leadership. Some of the more vocal supporters in Armenia for opening the border 
included the Prime Minister Andranik Markarian,28 Defense Minister Serge Sarkissian,29 
Deputy Minister of Trade and Economic Development Tigran Davtyan,30 and former Prime 
Minister and presidential candidate Vazgen Manukian.31
A very rough survey of Armeno-Turkish relations over the past several years reveals 
increased activities between the two states to break the existing deadlock between them. 
These actions include the creation of the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission 
(TARC) and the Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC). Created in 
Geneva on July 9, 2001, TARC became one of the hotly debated and contested organizations 
in Armenian communities around the world and in Armenia. 
The objectives of TARC were published in a document called Terms of Reference. 
According to it, the Reconciliation Commission aimed to promote mutual understanding and 
goodwill between Turks and Armenians, to encourage improved relations between Armenia 
and Turkey, to build on the increasing readiness for reconciliation among Turkish and 
Armenian civil societies including members of Diaspora communities, to support contact, 
dialogue and cooperation between Armenian and Turkish societies in order to create public 
awareness about the need for reconciliation and to derive practical benefits. Terms of 
Reference stated that the Reconciliation Commission would undertake activities and catalyze 
projects by other organizations and it would also develop recommendations to be submitted to 
concerned governments. The Reconciliation Commission pledged to support activities in the 
fields of business, tourism, culture, education, research, and environment.32
TARC did not deal with the Armenian Genocide or Nagorno-Karabakh problem rather 
it skipped them since they were deemed difficult to compromise. According to some of the 
members of the commission, the main idea behind the TARC was to open new horizons for 
the future and enhance mutual understanding between Turkey, Armenia and the Armenian 
Diaspora following a method of unofficial or second track diplomacy.33 The assumption that 
the governments of Armenia and Turkey had nothing to do with the founding and activities of 
TARC comes across as very naive. The statements issued by Armenia’s foreign ministry at 
the time stated that the Armenian government was aware of such activities, but did not 
participate in, nor prevent them.34 This statement was able to shift the criticism away from the 
Armenian government and onto the individual members of the commission itself. This is a 
perfect example of how the current Armenian administration handles the Armenian-Turkish 
relations and avoids coming under fire by the Diaspora. This is especially true considering 
 
28 “Armenian Prime Minister: Opening of Armenian-Turkish Border Mutually Beneficial,” Economic News, July 
31, 2002. 
29 “Armenian Defense Minister Gives Wide-Ranging Newspaper Interview,” Golos Armenii, September 9, 2003. 
30 “Minister Says Opening of Turkish Border to Bring Huge Dividends,” Arminfo, July 1, 2003 
31 “Veteran Armenian Politician Supports Opening of Borders with Turkey,” ArmenPress, August 4, 2003. 
32 See official TARC website at http://www.tarc.info/tor.htm. 
33 “Turks and Armenians Establish Reconciliation Body,” Reuters, July 10, 2001. 
34 See the official statement of the Armenian foreign Ministry on TARC on August 2, 2001, titled “TARC 
Statement,” at http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/PR/PR108.html. 
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that those segments opposed to any such activity, over the past years have become closely 
identified with President Kocharian’s administration. The short lived TARC was not able to 
create the rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey. Although TARC had unequivocally 
supported the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border, the discrediting of the members of the 
commission did not allow it to become a viable force in the process of such negotiations. 
Moreover the wide opposition that it faced from wide circles in the Diaspora and in 
Armenia,35 the Commission lacked the necessary momentum to become an actor in the 
Turkish-Armenian relations. Having been striped off of official support and not having 
popular backing, the commission met several time until it was dissolved in April 2004. 
Unlike TARC, the TABDC has been more consistent in its efforts. Established in May 
1997, TABDC served as a link between the public and private sectors within and in between 
Armenia and Turkey. Co-chaired by an Armenian (Arsen Ghazarian) and a Turk (Kaan 
Soyak), TABDC was able to promote and facilitate close cooperation between the Armenian 
and Turkish business circles. It also tried to establish direct trade and business links in various 
sectors, to maintain close ties between the governments of Armenia and Turkey to enable 
them to forge global economic policies.36 Active to this date, TABDC has been an active 
lobby which works in Ankara to open the border with Armenia.  
Unlike TARC, TABDC has been more of a business group and that might be one of 
the reasons why it faired better than TARC. Also the main concern of TABDC is the eastern 
region of Turkey and its view that opening of the border could bring in economic 
development to the regions of Kars and Erzerum through agricultural cooperation and 
tourism.37 Furthermore, TABDC’s efforts have been reinforced by the support they received 
from local government officials in Eastern Anatolia. For instance Kars mayor Naif Alibeyoglu 
was one of the main engines behind the drive to collect signatures of Kars residents to appeal 
to the Ankara government to open the border with Armenia.38 In a more recent development, 
it was announced that in January 2005, a tour of friendship by a non-governmental delegation 
of Kars to Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan will take place. Some circles 
expressed concerns that the delegation will be consisting mostly of border opening 
advocates.39
 
Who Would Benefit After All? 
The arguments for and against the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border vary from 
nationalist based rejection to a more pragmatic acceptance. As mentioned above since there 
have not been any full range economic researches conducted on this topic, assessing the 
economic benefits or losses of border opening remain ambiguous at best.  
 
35 Discussing about the opposition of TARC is beyond the confines of this paper. A comprehensive survey of the 
opposition to the Commission could be found at http://asbarez.com/TARC. 
36 See official TABDC website at http://www.tabdc.org/about.php. 
37 “150 Historical Monuments to be Restored and Relations to be Formed between Armenia and Erzurum, Kars,” 
Turkish Daily News, May 18, 2002. 
38 “Kars Mayor Urges Opening of Armenia Border Gate,” Turkish Daily News, June 9, 2004 and “Kars Governor 
has Collected 50,000 Signatures in favor of Opening of Armenian-Turkish Border,” Arminfo News Agency, 
November 11, 2004. 
39 “Azeri Consul General to Kars on Possible Opening of Armenian-Turkish Border,” Arminfo News Agency, 
December 7, 2004. 
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From a political perspective, the biggest loser of border opening would undoubtedly 
be Azerbaijan since its attempts to isolate Armenia and bring it to “submission” through 
blockade would fail. Moreover the Azerbaijani side would face tremendous pressure to deal 
with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict while Armenia is able to transcend the economic 
embargo. The completion of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline could also deprive Azerbaijan from its 
leverage against Turkey and the lobbying of pro-Azerbaijani groups in Ankara would 
significantly lose their power. 
From the Armenian perspective the opening of the border could be translated as a 
great diplomatic success and victory against Azerbaijan. However the victory could also be 
applied on the domestic front. The political gains that the Armenian government will receive 
include the propaganda that the policy of blockade has failed and that Armenia was 
victorious, consequently boosting President Robert Kocharian’s struggle with the Armenian 
opposition which has accused him of the isolation policy. Kocharian will prove his ability to 
end the country’s isolation without concessions in such principled issues as the Nagorno-
Karabakh. Geopolitically speaking the border opening could also lessen Armenia’s 
dependence on Russia and Georgia. The idea that relations with Turkey might be normal 
could eventually diminish the view that Armenia should rely on Russia to “protect” it from 
Turkey.40 Similarly the direct contact between Armenia and Turkey could make Georgia’s 
role as a transit country less important and hence put the relations between Tbilisi and 
Yerevan on a more equal footing. 
Regardless of the economic implications of the Turkish-Armenian border opening, the 
political gains for Armenia promises to be high. The main problem remains to “sell” the idea 
to nationalist circles in both Turkey and Armenia and divorcee it from the preconditions that 
both sides put forward. When and if the border is opened, Armenia’s position in the region 
could change drastically and it could become more active in regional political games by 
having more foreign policy alternatives and having the option of playing balance of power 
regionally to maximize its strategic gains.
 
40 It is worth mentioning here that the idea of reliance on third force mentioned at the beginning of this paper, has 
been re-emerging in Armenia. According to a survey done by a research center in Yerevan researchers are 
finding the “law to exclude third force” a more feasible alternative then relying on Russia or the West. See 
“Armenia’s National and International Security in the Next Decade,” Presentation of Expert and Public Poll 
Results, Armenian Center for National and International Studies, Yerevan Armenia August 2004. 
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